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Antitrust Boycott Analysis Applied
to a Harness Racing Association
BY A. VERNON CARNAHAN* AND DAvID S. VERSFELT* *
INTRODUCTION
For many centuries, I harness racing was a polite diversion for
European gentlemen willing to test their horses in, loosely-ar-
ranged contests of speed and endurance. 2 With its spread to the
New World, the sport attained a more formal structure and en-
tered a period marked by organized races at agricultural and
county fairs. 3 In present-century harness racing, the sport has
matured into a major international activity involving hundreds
of racetracks, thousands of breeders, trainers and horse owners,
many thousands of races each year, and millions of spectators. 4
In the early years of this modern development, a number of
factors tended to keep the antitrust laws from having a major im-
pact upon the sport. Although the financial aspects of the sport
have gained significance over the years, they did not match the
Member of the firm of Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New York City. A.B.
1939, Drew University; LL.B. 1942, Duke University.
.. Associated with the firm of Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New York City.
A.B. 1973, Princeton University; J.D. 1976, Columbia University.
I Harness racing is one of the oldest sports. During the 1930s, archaeological exca-
vations in present-day Turkey uncovered records of the training of harness racehorses dat-
ing from as early as 1350 B.C. The stone tablets contain descriptions confirming that the
trotting horse held an honored position in the Assyro-Babylonian Empire. 8 ENCYCLOPE-
DiA BRrrANNiCA 1101 (1977).2 For example, the Norfolk Trotter breed, which emerged in England around 1750,
was typically road-raced as entertainment for its owners. Id.
3 There were trotting racetracks in regular use in the United States by 1810. The
American Standardbred horse was formally established in 1879, and the Quadrilateral
Trotting Combination, now known as the Grand Circuit of American harness racing, was
formed in 1871. See generally, J. HERVEY, THE AMERICAN TRoTTER (1947).
" Several events occurred around 1940 to propel harness racing into its present,
flourishing condition. In 1939, a broadly based coalition of interested individuals estab-
lished The United States Trotting Association as a parent organization to formulate na-
tional rules of racing competition and to maintain comprehensive and accurate records for
the sport. The next year, Roosevelt Raceway in New York City commenced regularly
scheduled parimutuel night harness racing, and the mobile starting gate was introduced a
few years later. With the end of World War II, the sport was poised for rapid growth. Id.
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economic breadth of an oil or tobacco trust. 5 In addition, deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court declaring baseball to be
exempt from antitrust scrutiny left unclear the antitrdst status of
other sporting activities. 6 For decades, amicable resolutions of
disputes arising in harness racing operations were typically
reached without resort to litigation.
Now the sport is a major financial enterprise offering sub-
stantial commercial opportunities. Attendance at American har-
ness tracks rose from fewer than 6 million spectators in 1948 to a
fluctuating level of more than 25 million per year during the
1970s.7 The number of horses starting races increased from 9,300
5 As early as 1899, the oil empire established by John D. Rockefeller was worth hun-
dreds of millions of dollars and included more than 70 corporations. The United States Su-
preme Court found that combination to be unlawful in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911), a nationwide tobacco trust was found to constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade.
6 The Supreme Court first addressed the question of baseball's status under the anti-
trust laws in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), affg, 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920). The case was
brought by the only remaining team in the Federal League, which alleged that the Na-
tional and American Leagues had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of July 2, 1980 ch.
647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210, by buying some Federal League teams and otherwise inducing
others to abandon that league. 259 U.S. at 207. The Supreme Court found that although
the defendants' activities did involve interstate travel to play games, that "personal effort,
not related to production, is not a subject of [interstate] commerce." Id. at 209. Further,
the Court held that this transportation and interstate play was "a mere incident, not the
essential thing." Id. (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895)).
In the following decades, the interstate commerce basis for its reasoning was sub-
stantially undermined. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Neville, Baseball and the Antitrust
Laws, 16 FORDHAm L. REv. 208 (1947). Despite the change of the Supreme Court's ration-
ale concerning the interstate commerce clause, the Court continued to exempt the sport
from antitrust law. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). In any event, it was not until 1955 that the Court be-
gan to clarify that the baseball exemption did not encompass all sports in which the inter-
state commerce aspects could be characterized as "incidental." See United States v. Inter-
national Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (boxing is interstate trade for
purposes of the Sherman Act); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (ownership of
40 theatres in eight states held affecting interstate commerce for purposes of the Sherman
Act). In those cases, the Court for the first time made clear that its prior baseball decisions
had created a special exemption, not a general standard. See generally J. WEISrART & C.
LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.02 (1979).
7 Figures are from data compiled and preserved by the United States Trotting Asso-
ciation (USTA). See THE YEAR BOOK (published annually by USTA); 1982 USTA TROT-
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to more than 50,000 per year by 1981.8 Total purses soared from
less than $10 million to more than $247 million from 1948 to
1981, an increase of more than twenty-three fold.9 Economic in-
ducements include ever-increasing awards of prize money for
successful competitors,10 substantial purchase and stud prices for
promising horses," and burgeoning returns for racetracks, par-
ticularly organizations that sponsor pari-mutuel race meetings. 2
The financial development of the sport has brought chal-
lenges against racing associations by parties alleging that associa-
tion conduct restrains competition in violation of the antitrust
laws. Such challenges have compelled the courts to determine
whether a sporting enterprise should be evaluated under the
same antitrust doctrines that govern the conduct of commercial
corporations, or whether different doctrines should apply. In or-
der to illuminate an emerging variation of antitrust doctrine, this
Article will address the recent application of antitrust boycott
analysis in the context of a challenge to rules of a non-profit har-
ness racing association. The authors believe that this discussion,
while primarily focused on selected litigation involving harness
racing, can provide principles to guide antitrust analysis for asso-
ciations and other group entities in the area of equine and other
sports.
I. THE RuLE OF PER SE ILLEGALITYAND THE
CONCEPT OF A BOYCOTT
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[e]very contract,
combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
TING AND PACING GUIDE [hereinafter cited as 1982 GUIDE] (also published annually by
USTA).
8 1982 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 53.
9Id.
10 The purse earned by the winner of the prestigious Hanbletonian race for three-
year-old trotters in DuQuoin, Illinois, rose from $46,267 in 1947 (won by Hoot Mon) to
$838,000 in 1981 (won by Shiaway St. Pat). Winning purses for the Meadowlands, New
Jersey pace for three-year-olds have risen to $1 million in the five years the race has been
run. Id. at 171, 181. See N.Y. Times, July 18,1981, at 19, col. 2.
n In recent years, leading yearlings have been auctioned for between $200,000 and
$425,000. 1982 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 158.12 While it is difficult to obtain financial operating data for non-public racetracks,
the record amounts of pari-mutuel wagering for the largest of them amount to more than
$1 million per day. See id. at 5-18.
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merce among the several States."'3 Early United States Supreme
Court cases interpreting this provision held that it required a de-
termination of the "reasonableness" of the conduct challenged in
each case, 14 an approach long labeled the "rule of reason."' 5 For
certain types of conduct, however, the Court has applied a rule
of per se illegality that precludes inquiry into the reasonableness
of conduct considered to be a plainly anticompetitive restraint of
trade.' Boycotts, often called concerted refusals to deal, are one
form of conduct that has been condemned as per se unlawful.' 7
Loosely defined, a boycott exists when a group of actors in a
market seek to protect themselves from the competition of non-
group actors in that market. The means employed is some sort of
concerted action, typically a threat, intended to deprive the non-
group actors of trade relationships or opportunities which they
13 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
14 See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. at 1 (1911).
15 See 246 U.S. at 231; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 106. In
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, in evaluating a market restriction imposed by a
commodities exchange, the Court suggested that a determination under the rule of reason
would
[c]onsider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the re-
straint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
246 U.S. at 238. For a current description of relevant considerations, see National So'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
16 In other words, if the Court finds that the conduct falls within the definition of
conduct proscribed as per se unlawful, it makes no further findings and does not consider
any asserted justifications for the conduct. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,
446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam); 435 U.S. at 692; United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S.
596 (1972); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); General Cinema
Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1256-61 (C.D. Cal. 1982). If the
conduct is not per se unlawful, the Court proceeds to evaluate the alleged antitrust viola-
tions under the traditional rule of reason. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Determining whether the conduct at issue is a type proscribed as
per se unlawful is often a difficult task. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8
(1979) ("easy labels do not always supply ready answers").
17 See 446 U.S. at 643 (horizontal price fixing); California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Middal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 97 (1980) (vertical price fixing); 405 U.S. at
596 (horizontal territorial restraints and horizontal customer restraints); 356 U.S. at 1 (ty-
ing arrangements). The Supreme Court recently overruled application of the per se rule to
vertical territorial and customer restraints. See 433 U.S. at 36 (overruling United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
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need to compete. 18 Determining whether challenged conduct
constitutes an unlawful boycott is often a difficult task, however,
and applying a per se rule in this context has led to uneven hold-
ings by courts and widespread criticism by legal commentators.' 9
As one scholar notes, "there is more confusion about the scope
and operation of the per se rule against group boycotts than in
reference to any other aspect of the per se doctrine."0
II. THE SUPREME CouRTs EXPANSIVE LANGUAGE
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court offered its first2'
evaluation of a concerted refusal to deal in Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States. 2 A group of re-
18 Professor Sullivan, using for his example the "wholesale" level as the level of trade
in which the restraint takes place, describes a typical boycott:
[Tihe boycotting wholesalers may concertedly ask manufacturers not to sell
to the excluded wholesalers and expressly or impliedly threaten that if the
manufacturers do sell to the excluded wholesalers, the boycotting whole-
salers will withhold patronage. Alternatively, the boycotting wholesalers
may concertedly ask retailers not to buy from the excluded wholesalers, ex-
pressly or impliedly threatening that if the retailers do not comply the boy-
cotting wholesalers will stop selling to them.
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTIRUST § 83 (1977). Recently, the United
States Supreme Court explained that the group boycott concept "refers to a method of
pressuring a party with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to
withhold, patronage or services from the target." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Barry, 438 U.S. 531,541 (1978) (footnote omitted).
19 There are many scholarly reviews of the rule that boycotts are per se unlawful.
See, e.g., Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexam-
ination, 79 CoLuM. L. REV. 685 (1979); Horsley, Per Se Illegality and Concerted Refusals
to Depl, 13 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 484 (1971-72); McCormick, Group Boycotts-
Per Se or Not Per Se, That is the Question, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 703 (1976); Woolley, Is
a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws?, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 773 (1973-74).
Of these, the Bauer article is the most encompassing because it was written after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(19T, and therefore reflects that case's guidance as to application of per se rules. See the
text accompanying notes 68-80 infra for a discussion of the Supreme Court's current ap-
proach to per se illegality.
20 L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at § 83.
21 In Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904), the Court found unlawful an
agreement of an association of wholesalers and manufacturers that provided for expulsion
of any association member which sold to nonmembers. Id. at 47-48. While the Court con-
demned the agreement under § 1 of the Sherman Act, its decision did not make clear whe-
ther the agreement constituted a boycott or what standard was used to find it unlawful.
2 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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tailers had agreed not to purchase from wholesalers who made
direct sales to consumers. In condemning the retailers' agreement
under the rule of reason, the Court explained the impropriety of
a boycott in terms of the increased anticompetitive market
strength that arises with concerted action. That market power-
lawful if arising from unilateral decisions-is unlawful where it
is used in a joint effort to coerce wholesalers to conform to the re-
tailers' desired conduct.23 The agreement found unlawful in
Eastern States constituted a relatively narrow refusal to deal: an
attempt by a group of competitors at one market level to protect
themselves from competition from non-group members who
sought to compete at that level.24
In 1941, the Supreme Court first suggested that a per se rule
might apply to boycotts. In Fashion Originators' Guild of Amer-
ica, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,25 a group of designers
and manufacturers of women's garments and related textiles in-
stituted through the Guild a joint "protective" program to stop
certain of their competitors from "pirating" their clothing styles.
Under the program, clothing and textile manufacturers who
were Guild members agreed not to supply manufacturers or
stores that dealt in "pirated" products. 26 Acting on complaints
from the affected competitors, the Federal Trade Commission
challenged the Guild program as an unfair method of competi-
tion.
The Guild members asserted that their program was a
reasonable means of protecting against the unfair tactic of style
pirating. The Court, however, emphasized two aspects of the
Guild's program as evidence of its anticompetitive nature. First,
it effectively excluded from competition in the garment industry
any manufacturers or distributors which did not conform to
3 Id. at614.
24 During the decade of the 1920's, the Supreme Court reviewed at least one case in-
volving a boycott. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), a manu-
facturer sought to restrain labor union members who had established a "secondary boy-
cott" of his factory in an attempt to compel unionization. Id. at 446-47. In reversing de-
nial of injunctive relief, the Court found that the proscriptions of the Sherman Act applied
to the boycott regardless of its having arisen in the context of a labor dispute. Id. at 475-79.
There was no suggestion in the case that the per se rule might apply to boycotts.
25 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
26 Id. at 462-63.
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Guild rules, thereby tending toward a "monopoly" of the indus-
try by Guild members.A' Second, the program established the
Guild as "an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules
for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce .... ."28
In finding the Guild program to constitute an unlawful boycott,
the Court rejected the Guild's justifications: "Under these cir-
cumstances... the reasonableness of the methods pursued by
the combination to accomplish its unlawful object is no more ma-
terial than would be the reasonableness of the prices fixed by un-
lawful combination." Given the Court's limiting reference to
"these circumstances," its rejection of the Guild's purported jus-
tifications did not establish a per se rule. However, the Court ap-
pears to have meant that once the conduct had been character-
ized as constituting an anticompetitive boycott, no business justi-
fications could preclude a finding of unreasonable restraint.
Any question of whether or not the per se rule applied to boy-
cotts was affirmatively answered in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc. 30 In KIor's, a large retailer of appliances, Broad-
way-Hale, convinced several appliance manufacturers to stop
supplying Klor's, an appliance retailer which employed discount-
ing techniques in order to compete more effectively with Broad-
way-Hale. Kor's sued, alleging that the joint refusal to deal by
Broadway-Hale and the suppliers constituted an unlawful boy-
cott. The defendants asserted, inter alia,3' that their conduct was
not unreasonable because it had had no appreciable effect on
competition.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals' affirmation of the district court's dismissal of the com-
plaint. In a directive of seemingly unlimited scope, the Court de-
clared that group boycotts were always unlawful, regardless of
their circumstances or their actual effect:
7 Id. at 465.28 Id.
29 Id. at 468.
30 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
31 The threshold argument of the defendants was that their conduct did not give rise
to a cause of action in antitrust because there had been no public injury. Id. at 209-10. In
their view, even after the cessation of supplies to Kior's, there remained many stores in the
area selling their appliances or appliances of like quality and price. Id.
1981-82.]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal
with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden
category. They have not been saved by allegations that they
were reasonable in. the specific circumstances. . .. Even
when they operated to lower prices or temporarily to stimulate
competition they were banned. 32
The Court emphasized the consequences to the boycotted party
of the defendants' agreement not to deal, particularly the fact
that Kor's was deprived of the freedom to bid for appliances
from all suppliers. Also, as in Fashion Originators' Guild, the
Court noted the risk that termination of small businesses like
Kor's would create a tendency toward monopoly.-,
The Klor's decision significantly broadened the apparent
scope for reliance on a per se rule in the boycott context. Unlike
Eastern States 4 and Fashion Originators' Guild,s3 the challenged
agreement was not an attempt by a group of competitors at one
market level to insulate itself against competition from non-
group members at that same market level. Rather, the Klor's
boycott was induced by a single retail competitor and might have
been accepted by the participating suppliers for a variety of
reasons relating to valid vertical distribution arrangements.36
Although the language in Klor's is dictum, the decision sug-
gests that any combination that deprives a potential participant
of the ability to participate in a market must be condemned un-
der the per se rule as manifestly anticompetitive conduct, regard-
less of the intent of the actors or the purported justifications for
the conduct. The Court failed to establish a limiting principle to
that apparently boundless axiom.
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE SUPREME COURTS EXPANSIVE LANGUAGE
Since Klor's, the United States Supreme Court has often reaf-
32 Id. at 212 (footnote and citations omitted).
33 Id. at 213-14.
3 See the text accompanying notes 22-24 supra for a discussion of Eastern States.
3 See the text accompanying notes 25-29 supra for a discussion of Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild.
I See generally Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 36; Pitof-
sky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 CoLUMi.
L. REv. 1 (1978).
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firmed the principle that boycotts are per se unlawful.37 Never-
theless, subsequent decisions by lower federal courts-and even
the Supreme Court-demonstrate a reluctance to afford the
Klor's rule its broadest possible reading.
A. The Non-Commercial Context of the Restraint
Barely a year after Klor's was decided, a federal district court
considered whether the per se rule should apply in the context of
a challenge to the by-laws of a non-profit association dedicated
to regulating and improving the conduct of harness racing. In
United States v. United States Trotting Association,s8 the govern-
ment contended that the operation of the rules and regulatons
governing the United States Trotting Association (USTA)39 effec-
37 See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 729
(1975); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S.
238, 250 (1968); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 n.5 (1967); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341 (1963); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259-60, 263 (1963); Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 708 (1962); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curlam). In addi-
tion, there is dicta from non-boycott cases decided prior to Klor's. See, e.g., Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 5; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. JosephE. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211, 214 (1951); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948). In its
most recent comments the Court has hinted that it might be prepared to reexamine wheth-
er all boycotts are per se unlawful. See National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452
U.S. 378 (1981); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. at 531. See the text ac-
companying notes 73-80 infra for a discussion of the Court's possible reexamination of the
per se doctrine as applied to boycotts.
38 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,761 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
39 Since its founding in 1939, USTA had been the only national, non-profit member-
ship corporation dedicated to the promotion and furtherance of the sport of harness rac-
ing. It maintained a comprehensive system of records and services for the sport, collecting
and compiling extensive breeding and performance data for standardbred horses. See the
text accompanying notes 84-101 infra for a more extensive discussion of USTA's record-
keeping system.
Its membership was open not only to racetracks and other entities involved in the
sport, but also to all individual horse persons who acted as horse owners, drivers, breeders
or race officials. USTA's by-laws provided for membership on a nondiscriminatory basis
for three classes of members: Track members (those who sponsor and conduct harness race
meetings); Active members (others who are active in the sport as owners, breeders, race
officials, etc.); and Associate members (anyone interested in the sport but not qualified as
a Track or Active member). 1960 Trade Cas. (CC-) 69,761, at 76.959. Indeed, USTA's
membership, which today comprises more than 40,000, includes virtually every individ-
ual and organization interested in the sport. Id. at 76,960.
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tuated a boycott that, under Kior's, was per se unlawful.
Track members of USTA agree to admit only drivers and of-
ficials licensed by the association, and to enter only those horses
certified as "eligible" by USTA.4O In turn, only USTA members
can obtain an eligibility certificate, so the membership standards
for horse owners augment the restrictions placed upon partic-
ipating racetracks. 4' Thus, as a practical matter, horsemen who
refuse to join USTA might not be eligible for some opportunities
to participate in the sport. Although there was no evidence in
Trotting Association that USTA had permanently excluded any
applicant for membership, 42 the government alleged that the as-
sociation's membership provisions and a host of other rules and
regulations constituted a boycott that, under Klor's, was unlaw-
ful regardless of their purposes.43
The district court rejected that contention, ruling that the
particular measures used by USTA to achieve its goals were
"reasonable restraints that merely regulate and standardize har-
ness racing, promote competition in harness racing, and general-
ly enable U.S.T.A. to attain its main and not unlawful pur-
poses."" The district court rejected an excessive reliance on the
dicta contained in the United States Supreme Court's boycott de-
cisions:
Present in all the ... cases was the common evil of coercive
action against parties outside the group ....
The construction for which the Government contends
holds the dicta [of the decisions] to be an unqualified condem-
nation of all group refusals to deal, irrespective of their intent
and effect and the means employed to accomplish the purposes
of the combination. Within the all-embracing compass of the
construction a group refusal to deal motivated by legitimate
business reasons, exerting no coercion upon outsiders and re-
sulting in no unreasonable restraint of trade, would neverthe-
less be a violation of the antitrust act. 45
40 CHANTER, BY-LAws AND RuLEs AND REGULATIONS OF UNITED STATES TRnMcr As-
SOCIATION Rule 9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as USTA RULE].
41 Id.
42 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,761, at 76, 961.
43 d. at 76,957.
44Id.
45 Id. at 76,955 (quoting United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp.
684, 698 (N.D. Ohio 1956)).
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Avoiding these consequences of excessive reliance on per se pro-
scription, the court found that USTA's rules and regulations, "in-
sofar as they may be called group boycotts or concerted refusals
to deal, are not such commercial boycotts as have been stricken
down in previous cases as unlawful per se."46 To the district
court, a restriction not animated at least in part by an anticom-
petitive purpose did not warrant application of a per se rule.
Since United States v. United States Trotting Association,
other courts have refused to apply a per se rule where the chal-
lenged restriction occurred in a non-commercial context absent
an anticompetitive purpose.41 Courts evaluating conduct in
sports contexts have announced a variety of formulations with
which to measure the requisite commercial anticompetitive-
ness. 48 But all of the formulations reflect the interpretation of the
law first set forth in the equine context in Trotting Association.
B. The Self-Regulatory Needs of the Enterprise
The United States Supreme Court suggested another means
of limiting the scope of Klor's in Silver v. New York Stock Ex-
change. 49 In Silver, a direct competitor of exchange members was
denied telephone and tickertape connections with exchange
members pursuant to an exchange by-law. 0 As in Eastern States
and Fashion Originators'. Guild, the challenged combination was
implemented to restrict a horizontal competitor, a type of con-
duct falling well within the scope of the per se language con-
tained in Klor's. However, while the Court characterized the
conduct as unlawful under the Sherman Act,5' it delineated an
46 Id. at 76,955.
4 7 See, e.g., Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Feminist Women's Health Center,
Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Dee-
sen v. Professional Golfers! Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
846(1966).
48 See 594 F.2d at 1298-99 n.3 ("arguably demonstrable anticompettiveness"); Hat-
ley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 1977) ("minimal indicia
of anticompetitive purpose or effect"); Florists' Nationwide Tel. Delivery Network, Amer-
ica's Phone-Order Florists, Inc. v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263, 268 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967) (practices "on their face unduly restrictive").
49 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
51 Id. at 344.
11 Clearly condemning the conduct under the antitrust laws, the Court stated the ap-
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"exception" to such invalidation where the conduct rested on a
"justification derived from the policy of another statute or other-
wise."52 Applying the exception to Silver, the Court found that
the policies underlying the Securities Exchange Act of 19340
mandated that private exchanges be permitted to regulate them-
selves, by means of appropriate procedures, without application
of the full restrictions of the antitrust laws.M Because the ex-
change rule in issue had been enforced without appropriate pro-
cedural safeguards, the Court found it invalid,5 but not without
endorsing the principle that an industry's need for a limited de-
gree of self-regulation may prevent application of the per se rule.
In 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit relied on Silver to exempt from per se review a quarter horse
association's rules for registering members of the breed. In Hat-
ley v. American Quarter Horse Association, 6 the association re-
fused to register a colt as a quarter horse because the extent of its
white markings indicated that it was arguably a pinto, or paint,
horse.5 The horse owner challenged the decision as arbitrary and
sought judicial relief. He alleged that the association's refusal to
register the colt constituted a boycott illegal per se and included
as a pendant claim a denial of due process under state lawrs The
trial court dismissed the antitrust claim, but judgment was en-
tered for the plaintiff on the ground that the association's action
was violative of due process under Texas law -9
The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the antitrust claim
after rejecting application of the per se rule. Noting that the Sil-
plicable principle in a formulation as broad as that of Klor's: "A valuable service germane
to petitioners' business and important to their effective competition with others was with-
held from them by collective action. That is enough to create a violation of the Sherman
Act."Id. at 348-49 n.5.
52 Id. at 348-49.
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
54 373 U.S. at 357-61.
Id. at 364-67.
56 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977).
' The quarter horse is distinguished from other horses by performance, conforma-
tion and coloring. The quarter horse is typically a solid color except for occasional white
on the lower legs and part of the face. Such factors distinguish it from pinto (paint) and
appaloosa horses, which have distinctive, irregular white markings. Id. at 649 and n.5.
M Id. at 648-49, 651.
59 Id. at 648-49.
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ver decision appeared to allow reliance on the rule of reason
where a boycott might possess a "justification derived from the
policy of another statute or otherwise," the court reasoned that
[i]n an industry which necessarily requires some interde-
pendence and cooperation, the per se rule should not be ap-
plied indiscriminately. In some sporting enterprises a few rules
are essential to survival .... If the inquiry [of the association
into the definition of a quarter horse] is anti-competitive, the
rule of reason can be utilized to attack it.'
Furthermore, the court reasoned, the per se rule should not be
invoked "without at least minimal indicia of anti-competitive
purpose or effect," which the court found absent in Hatley.62 The
court went on to find the association's rules acceptable under the
rule of reason, although it affirmed the award of injunctive relief
based on the "procedural lapse" in the particular claim.6
Since the Silver and Hatley decisions, a number of courts
have recognized that in certain self-regulatory contexts rules
must be developed to ensure the viability of the enterprise, and
that application of a per se rule is improper. 4 Particularly in the
context of professional sports, courts have maintained that inter-
dependent activities should be judged under the rule of reason.I
o Id. at 652 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. at 348-49) (emphasis
added by the court in Hatley).
61 Id. at 652-53. The court noted that "[p]rofessional sports operations have occa-
sionally benefited from judicial reluctance to apply the per se doctrine, although the
reasoning may not have been explicit." Id. at 652 (citingBridge Corp. of Am. v. American
Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940
(1971); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358"F.2d at 165).
12 552 F.2d at 653.
63 Id. at 657-58.
64 E.g., Ackerman-Chillingsworth, Div. of Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Pacific
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979);
Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle
States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 965 (1970).
6 E.g., Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d at 1299 n.4; Smith v. Pro Foot-
ball, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1182; Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d
1136, 1151-54 (5th Cir. 1977); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 618-20
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American
Contract Bridge League, 428 F.2d at 1369; Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am.,
1981-82.]
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Of notable relevance to the equine sports is the district court's de-
cision in Cooney v. American Horse Shows Association. 6 The
court declined to apply the per se standard to an association dis-
ciplinary rule that acted to exclude the plaintiff from horse shows
sanctioned by the defendant association. In dicta, the court re-
ferred to Silver and noted that "there is an exception from the per
se rule for reasonably self-regulated industries."6
C. The Supreme Court Re-evaluation
Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to
reconsider, even abandon, certain per se rules. Its attitude may
provide encouragement for lower courts reluctant to apply a per
se rule for boycotts. In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.,6 the Court overruled an established doctrine of per se anal-
ysis in the context of territorial confinement and customer alloca-
tion. 19 In doing so, the Court offered some general guidelines for
application of per se rules, all of which urge restraint in their use:
"Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to
conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." 70 Echoing the dis-
trict court's view set forth in Trotting Association,71 the Court
suggested a role for per se rules where the restraint in issue has a
"'pernicious effect on competition'" and "'lack[s] . . .any re-
deeming virtue.' "72
358 F.2d at 171-72; Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp.
1103, 1115 (D. Neb.), affd, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981); College Athletic Placement
Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,117 (D.N.J.), affd, 506 F.2d 1050
(3d Cir. 1974); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462,503 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
6 495 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
7Id. at 430 n.3.
68 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
69In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Court had
held vertical territorial and customer restraints on the sale of goods illegal per se where the
title to the goods passes to the purchaser. That doctrine had been frequently criticized by
courts and commentators, a factor considered by the Court in overturning the rule in Con-
tinental. 433 U.S. at 48-49 nn.13-14.70 d. at 49-50.
71 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,761 (S.D. Ohio 1960). See the text accompanying
notes 38-48 supra for a discussion of this case.
72433 U.S. at 50 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 365 U.S. at 5). See
also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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Indeed, in its most recent cases involving group boycotts, St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry73 and National Geri-
medical Hospital v. Blue Cross,74 the Court hinted that it might
explicitly curtail the scope of the per se rule for boycotts. At issue
in Barry was the antitrust exemption for insurance companies co-
dified in the McCarren-Ferguson Act. 75 The Court had to decide
whether the term "boycott" in that Act had its "ordinary Sher-
man Act meaning" as a concerted refusal to deal. 7 The Court
discussed some early group boycott cases, emphasizing the
various terms that had at times been used to describe the chal-
lenged conduct, and noting that commentators had attempted
"to develop a test for distinguishing the types of restraints 'that
warrant per se invalidation from other concerted refusals to deal
that are not inherently destructive of competition."77 The Court
declined to express an opinion as to the merits of any particular
approach,78 but its comment suggests a willingness to recognize
that Klor's rule of per se invalidity does not apply to all joint refu-
sals to deal.
In National Gerimedical Hospital, the issue before the Court
was whether a federal health planning statute79 exempted Blue
Cross's conduct from antitrust scrutiny. The Court found no
exemption and remanded for a determination on the merits. In
doing so, it reminded the court on remand to "give attention to
the particular economic context in which the alleged conspiracy
and 'refusal to deal' took place."80 As in Barry, the Court's com-
ment suggests that it agrees with lower federal courts' attempts to
establish reasonable bounds for the per se rule outlined in prior
Court dicta.
73 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
74 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976).
76 438 U.S. at 542.
"
7 Id. at 542 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
7 After presenting its lengthy dictum regarding the per se boycott rule, the Court re-
treated from expressly limiting it: "But the issue before us is whether the conduct in ques-
tion involves a boycott, not whether it is per se unreasonable." Id. at 542.
79 The statute was the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); the section at issue in National Gerlmedical Hospital was 42 U.S.C. 3001 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
80 452 U.S. at 393 n.19.
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IV. USTA v. CHICAGO DOWNS ASSoCIATION81
The most authoritative pronouncement for the proposition
that a per se rule is inappropriate in the context of a sports asso-
ciation's regulatory rules is the 1981 decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in The United States
Trotting Association v. Chicago Downs Association.82 The issue
arose out of a dispute over use of records and services at Sports-
man's Park, a harness racetrack in Cicero, Illinois. Chicago
Downs Association ("Chicago Downs") and its co-defendant,
Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc. ("Fox Valley") were both Illinois
corporations which, during a number of weeks each year, oper-
ated pari-mutuel harness races at Sportsman's Park racetrack."
A. The Records and Services in Dispute in Chicago Downs
USTA maintains a nationwide system of records and services
for the promotion of harness racing. It is the only organization
that gathers pertinent breeding information about every stand-
ardbred horse foaled in the United States in order to identify
conclusively every harness horse in the nation. 4 The means used
to fix and maintain horse identities include lip tattoos", and regis-
tration certificates,e which are intended to remain with the
horse's owner. When a horse is sold, the registration certificate
must be endorsed on the back by the seller showing the sale date
81 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (en bane). The authors represented USTA in the lit-
igation.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 782-84. Chicago Downs and Fox Valley are in fact management organiza-
tions which sponsor race meetings at the racetrack, but such entities are customarily re-
ferred to as "tracks." An additional defendant, Illinois Harness Horseman's Association,
was joined over the objection of USTA in one of the three consolidated cases in the litiga-
tion. Id. at 783 n.1.
84 By registering foals, USTA not only obtains early evidence of the foals descrip-
tion, pedigree and date of birth, but it also prevents duplication of names. Id. at 784. See
USTA RULE 26 §§ 8, 10.
85 USTA RuLE 7 § 8. In 1981, USTA supervised the lip tattooing of 13,866 horses,
bringing the total number of horses tattooed by USTA to 192,344. See 1982 GUIDE, supra
note 7, at 1-53.
86 665 F.2d at 784. Registration certificates contain a statement of the horse's pedi-
gree, a description of its color, markings and sex, and the name and address of its breeder
and owner. USTA RuLE 26 § 8.
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and the buyer's name and address, and then must be returned to
USTA to allow updating of USTA's files.87
Also, USTA supervises compilation of records on every har-
ness race run in this country, with detailed information about
each standardbred horse's performance. The certificates used for
this purpose, called eligibility certificates, record the horse's cur-
rent ownership and past performance, including such data as
year-to-date and life earnings and year-to-date and previous
year's race performances. m The certificate accompanies the horse
from track to track during the racing season so that the horse's
current data is always available to track racing secretaries, who
rely on the certificate to determine the horse's eligibility and to
classify it properly for racing.89 After every day of racing, up-
dated information is entered on the eligibility certificates and is
also sent to USTA's headquarters for addition to the horse's per-
manent file. 9
USTA provides a number of other services for promotion of
the sport. It certifies drivers91 and trainers92 and publishes a
weekly list of drivers who have been suspended or fined because
of infractions of racing rules,9 and it certifies racing officials em-
87665 F.2d at 784. See USTA RuLE 9(3)(b). In an attempt to maintain the compre-
hensive accuracy of its registration system, USTA's Rules provide a schedule of monetary
fines to be paid by horseowners who fail to return the certificates to USTA for updating
promptly after a horse's change in ownership. USTA RULE 22, & 26 § 20.
8 USTA RuLE 9. Eligibility certificates also contain a "Steward's Listing" reflecting
the horse's unmanageability, illness or injuries affecting its qualification to race. USTA
RULE 9, 14 & 20 § 14.
89 665 F.2d at 784-85. See USTA RULE 9 § 1. Tracks typically prepare their program
sheets from the information contained on eligibility certificates. If any questions arise re-
garding particular information, the data on the certificate can be verified by checking it
with data on file at USTA's headquarters. 665 F.2d at 784-85. See USTA RuLE 9.
90 USTA RULE 9 § 1. Track racing secretaries, who must be licensed by the USTA,
send all race data directly to USTA on forms known as Judges Sheets. USTA RULE 9 & 20.
Keeping all current data centrally filed with USTA provides an effective protection for the
integrity of the sport's racing information. As a consequence, such practices as fraudulent
substitution of horses ("ringing") and fraudulent race performance records ("prepping"),
both of which were widespread prior to formation of USTA in 1939, have all but disap-
peared from the sport. See United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,761.
91 USTA RULE 17.
92 Id.
93 USTA RULE 22 § 2. Without such a published listing, a driver could effectively es-
cape major consequences of his racing misconduct by transferring his base of operations to
a different geographic area or racing circuit.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ployed by racetracks to attest to their competence and knowledge
of racing rules.94 In addition, USTA offers public relations assis-
tance and promotional aids to assist tracks in fostering interest in
the sport."5
USTA is funded by dues from its members and fees from
others who contract to use its services. Because they rely heavily
upon the racing information contained on USTA's certificates,
the approximately seventy pari-mutuel racetracks around the
country have traditionally contributed financially to USTA for
the continued maintenance of the records system. 0 If a pari-mu-
tuel track intends to use USTA's records and services but does not
choose to become a member paying membership dues, it must
support the system of records and services as a "contract track"
and annually pay a graduated fee.97
In light of the sport's extensive reliance on its data base,
USTA has established a number of restrictions intended to pro-
tect the integrity of the system. Its certificates, particularly the
eligibility certificates, note USTA's interest and make clear the
intended scope of the data to be gathered.98 Its rules require that
all individuals responsible for handling USTA data at racetracks
be licensed by USTA, even if they are employees of the race-
track.9 In addition, Rule 5 of USTA's rules prohibits submission
of USTA eligibility certificates to tracks which have refused to
94 USTA RuLE 6 § 23.
9 USTA RULE BY-LAws, ART. I, § 4.98 USTA's present system of dues and fees was most recently modified in 1975 as part
of a review process in which parimutuel track members of the association participated.
97 USTA RULE 4 § 37. For Chicago Downs and Fox Valley, which operate with
average gross betting receipts of more than $1 million per day during their race meetings,
the contract track fee to USTA would be $330 per racing day, or between $10,000-$20,000
per year.
98 See 665 F.2d at 785. Eligibility certificates contain the following legend:
This eligibility certificate and the information contained on it are the prop-
erty of USTA and all rights to its use and reproduction are reserved by it. Use
of this certificate and the information contained hereon is restricted to mem-
bers of USTA and tracks contracting with the Association and only for the
purposes of entering, classifying and identifying the horse named hereon and
for recording its performances. Permission for any other use of this certif-
icate and the information contained on it or for its use by any other person or
organization must be obtained from USTA.
Id. at 785; see id. at 785-86 n.6.
'9 USTA RULE 6.
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support the records system either by joining USTA as a member
or by paying the contract track fee. If, after due notice from
USTA of a track's refusal to participate in the system, a member
nonetheless chooses to race his horse there, the horse is thereafter
ineligible for entry in any race at a USTA-affiliated track requir-
ing a current and verified eligibility certificate. 100 A somewhat
similar restriction in Rule 17 applies to drivers licensed by USTA;
they can be fined for racing at a non-participating track.' 0' The
avowed purpose of these requirements is to prevent horses and
drivers from competing at tracks at which USTA has no control
over recordkeeping and thus no assurance of care in handling the
* data required for eligibility and registration certificates. Applica-
tion of such restrictions, as a practical matter, is the only method
available to a sports association such as USTA; it can supervise
only the conduct of those who have agreed to abide by its rules of
governance. Nonetheless, invocation of Rules 5 and 17 isolates
non-participants from access to USTA's system of records and
services and promotes a collective refusal-to-deal among USTA
participants against nonparticipants.
B. Proceedings in the District Court
Chicago Downs and Fox Valley had utilized USTA's records
and services during the years prior to 1977, and they continued to
do so thereafter under the protection of a court order. 102 But since
100 In relevant part, USTA RULE 5 provides:
Horses racing after January 1, 1940, upon due notice (at least 45 days
wherever possible) to members on tracks which are not in contract or which
are not in membership with The United States Trotting Associa-
tion... shall from the date of the first such race be ineligible to race in any-
thing but a free-for-all, and he is barred from classified and claiming and
conditioned races and no eligibility certificate will be issued on that horse in
the future.
101 In relevant part, USTA RuLE 17 § 5 provides:
Any licensed driver who shall participate in a meeting or drive a horse
at a meeting not in membership with this Association... shall be fined not
to exceed $100 for each such offense: PROVIDED HOWEVER, that noth-
ing herein contained shall prevent any person from driving at a contract
track or from participating in a meeting conducted at such a track.
102 665 F.2d at 784. Early in the litigation, USTA was enjoined from attempting to
prevent Chicago Downs or Fox Valley from relying on and benefiting from its records
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1977, they had refused to pay for the services through either an-
nual membership dues or the contract track fee. In 1977, they
announced their intention to utilize USTA's certificates and ser-
vices without payment of any fees at all and to "free ride" on the
efforts of USTA and the financial support of USTA members and
contract tracks. 1° As a result, USTA brought complaints against
the tracks in the Northern District of Illinois in an attempt to pre-
vent them from using its records and services without reimburse-
ment. 10
On four occasions during 1977, 1978 and 1979, USTA in-
formed its members by letter of the tracks' refusal to pay dues or
fees and reminded them of the terms of Rules 5 and 17.11 The
April 6, 1978 letter from William Hilliard, then executive vice
president of USTA, explained that USTA's "records and services,
collected and maintained at great expense ... should not be
misappropriated and used without payment," and that its rec-
ords and services "will become impossible" if Fox Valley or other
tracks could use them without otherwise participating in USTA's
data-collection system. 0
On May 1, 1978, Fox Valley responded by interposing a
counterclaim seeking injunctive relief and charging USTA with
instigation of a group boycott with respect to Fox Valley's 1978
race meeting. 107 Fox Valley alleged that the letters from Mr. Hil-
liard constituted concerted action to boycott the track in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.l18
On September 1, 1978, Fox Valley and Chicago Downs
moved for summary judgment dismissing USTA's complaints. In
response, on October 5, 1978, USTA moved for summary judg-
ment on the issue of liability for misappropriation. Later, while
those motions were still pending, Fox Valley moved for summary
judgment on its counterclaim, and USTA cross-moved for sum-
and services. In return, the tracks were ordered to pay into court the applicable amounts
of contract track fees. Id. at 784 n.4.
103 Id. at 784.
104 Id. at 782-83.
'o5 Id. at 784-85.
'6 Id. at 785 n.6.
107 The counterclaim was interposed by Fox Valley in case no. 78C-1258. 665 F.2d
at 783.
'o8 Id. at 787.
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mary judgment dismissing the counterclaim. 109
On March 18, 1980, the Illinois Federal District Court
granted both of the racetracks' two motions for summary judg-
ment."0 Regarding the antitrust counterclaim, the court relied
on Fashion Originators' Guild and what it characterized as
"strong language" in Klor's to use the per se rule in evaluating
USTA's invocation of Rules 5 and 17. As the district court ex-
plained those cases,
[I]n interpreting the meaning and scope of Section 1, the Su-
preme Court has ruled that certain kinds of restraints are so in-
herently unreasonable and anticompetitive in nature that they
are illegal per se. Included in the per se category are group
boycotts which generally arise when one party convinces or co-
erces another party to refrain from dealing with a third
party."'
The court agreed with Fox Valley that "the facts of the in-
stant case clearly indicate that a boycott exists .... USTA has
combined with member horse owners to boycott non-USTA affil-
iated tracks." 12 Without reference to the evidentiary record, and
without consideration of the self-regulatory purposes underlying
USTA's procedures, the court labeled the challenged conduct a
group boycott and considered it unlawful per se:
Fox Valley and Chicago Downs refused to join USTA or pay a
specified fee for services. As a result, member horsemen were
warned by USTA that they faced the imposition of USTA sanc-
tions if they continued to race at Fox Valley. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is clear that the purpose of USTA's actions is to
1o9 Id. at 783.
110 487 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. 11.1980), rew'd, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
On the misappropriation count, the district court relied on the fact that registration and
eligibility certificates travel with the horse to conclude that USTA's interest in them was
insufficient to rebut the "prima facie evidence of ownership of the certificates by the horse
owners." 487 F. Supp. at 1012. The express declaration of USTA's ownership that appears
on the eligibility certificates was dismissed by the district court as being of no merit be-
cause of the "adhesive nature" of the relationship of horse owners to the association. Id. at
1013-14. Thus, the court dismissed USTA's complaints. See note 98 supra for the text of an
eligibility certificate.
"1 487 F. Supp. at 1014 (footnotes omitted).
112 Id. at 1015.
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effectuate a group boycott against tracks which do not abide
by its terms and conditions. 13
The district court recognized that "there are circumstances"
when the rule of reason test is applicable rather than the per se
rule."' Yet it considered the exception set forth in Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange to be exclusive. Adopting the view of Silver
set forth in a district court case arising in an unrelated sport,
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., the court set
forth its standards for the exception:
Silver reaffirms the application of the per se rule to group
boycotts with one narrow exception. The cases falling into this
category would be governed by the rule of reason. To qualify,
several prerequisites must be demonstrated:
(1) There is a legislative mandate for self-regulation or other-
wise ....
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end
consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is
reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more exten-
sive than necessary.
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which as-
sure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a
basis for judicial review. 116
The court found that USTA could not qualify for this exception
because its self-regulatory conduct was "more extensive than
necessary" and not reasonably related to the goal of "maintaining
integrity in racing."' 7
In essence, the district court relied almost exclusively on the
113 Id. (footnote omitted).
114 Id.
115 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (cited in 487 F. Supp. at 1015-16). Denver
Rockets predated recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court and other courts regard-
ing the appropriate scope of per se rules. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S.
at 8; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 47-48. See the text accom-
panying notes 72-80 supra for a discussion of the Supreme Court's reevaluation of the per
se rules. In addition, recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit have cast doubt on the validity
of the holding in Denver Rockets. See Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d at
1297; Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936
(1979).
116 325 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
117 487 F. Supp. at 1016 (footnote omitted).
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sweeping dictum of Klor's to condemn the conduct undertaken
by USTA to protect its complex records system. The court offered
little or no discussion of the purposes or effects of USTA's con-
duct, in relation to either the record system, the racetracks or the
sport as a whole. While the court acknowledged the holding in
Silver as having created an "exception" to per se proscription, it
interpreted the "exception" narrowly and did not refer to any of
the several cases arising in non-commercial and sports contexts in
which self-regulation untainted by anticompetitiveness had been
evaluated under the rule of reason. 118
C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
With one judge dissenting and one concurring," 9 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, en bane, reversed the judgment of the
district court in all respects.tm The court of appeals began its
analysis of the antitrust issue by noting that the rule of reason is
the traditional standard applied for the majority of anticompet-
itive practices challenged under section I of the Sherman Act. In-
deed, the court characterized the per se rule as one best applied
"only after courts have had considerable experience with the type
of conduct challenged and application of the Rule of Reason has
118 Id. See the text accompanying notes 38-48 supra for a review of these cases.
119 Judge Bauer dissented from the judgment of the court, arguing to uphold the
judgment of the district court on all grounds. 665 F.2d at 792-95 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
Judge Cudahy concurred in the reversal of the judgment of the district court, but dissented
from the court's entry of judgment in USTA's favor with regard to eligibility certificates.
Id. at 791-92 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
120 In regard to the non-antitrust issues in the appeal, the court reversed the district
court's summary judgment for the two racetracks and entered partial summary judgment
for USTA. Id. at 787. It pointed out that the defendants and the district court had left un-
answered USTA's affidavits and documentary materials demonstrating that the eligibility
certificates, and possibly the registration certificates, are its property. Of particular signif-
icance to the court was the legend contained on the eligibility certificates, which the dis-
trict court had discounted because of their "adhesive nature." 487 F. Supp. at 1013-14.
The court of appeals declined to find adhesion because of the "institutional means avail-
able [to USTA members] through which the horseowners collectively can modify or elim-
inate any terms in the eligibility certificates with which they disagree." 655 F.2d at 786.
On the record in the case, that legend was sufficient to support USTA's claim of ownership
of eligibility certificates. However, the record was found insufficient to find on summary
judgment that USTA owned registration certificates, so USTA was directed on remand to
submit further evidence to show that it had sufficient ownership rights to ground a misap-
propriation claim as to those certificates. Id. at 787.
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inevitably resulted in a finding of anticompetitive effects."'12
While recognizing that the Supreme Court relied on a per se rule
in Fashion Originators' Guild and Klor's, Inc., the court pre-
saged its recognition of limits to that rule by emphasizing that
"[tihe danger of rote application of the per se rule to all conduct
that can be called a 'group boycott' is that the sound teachings of
experience will be extended into new and unfamiliar areas where
they have no proper application." 22
The district court's application of the per se rule was found
improper for two reasons, each of which reflected one of the lim-
itations on the per se rule presented in cases decided since Klor's.
First, the challenged restraints were not the type traditionally
characterized as commercial, and there was nothing in USTA's
conduct suggesting a purpose to exclude commercial compet-
itors.
At the most obvious level, Fox Valley had no intention of set-
ting up an organization to rival USTA, and USTA was not Fox
Valley's competitor in the business of organizing harness race
meetings. There is no indication either of any subtler scheme,
as for example groups of drivers or owners using USTA as a
means to eliminate other drivers or owners, or certain tracks
combining behind the facade of USTA to drive Fox Valley out
of business. There is a strong showing, to the contrary, that
USTA was organized to ensure honest harness racing rather
than to impose a "naked restraint of trade with no purpose ex-
cept stifling of competition."' 2 3
In the absence of some showing of anticompetitiveness, applica-
tion of the per se rule would be inappropriate.
Second, the court endorsed the principle, "derived more or
less proximately from Silver," that "in certain self-regulatory
121 Id. at 788 (quoting Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 555 (7th
cir. 1980)).
122 655 F.2d at 788.
123 Id. at 788-89 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. at 263). The
court noted the extent to which USTA RULE 5 & 17 address the association's "free-rider"
problems, a consideration which the Supreme Court considered worthy of "serious atten-
tion" in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54-57. Cf. Posner, The
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1, 6-10 (1977).
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contexts binding rules must be developed to safeguard the enter-
prise's viability, and that application of a per se standard of ille-
gality to such endeavors is improper."' Relying on decisions of
lower courts in the context of league or other organized sports,
the court declared that formalistic labels'such as "group boycott"
and "per se" should not preclude inquiry into the business neces-
sity for particular rules and practices where the nature of the en-
terprise requires some degree of self-regulation. 125
Relying on these two considerations, the court concluded
that the rule of reason should apply to test USTA Rules 512 and
17. I-According to the court, the rule of reason is the proper test
"either because sporting activities and organizations are entitled
to a fuller form of antitrust analysis in recognition of their need
for self-regulation, or because the conduct at issue here is not
within the undeniably anticompetitive per se boycott para-
digm."12 The court remanded the issue to the district court to de-
termine whether the challenged conduct went beyond the level
of restraint reasonably necessary to accomplish whatever legit-
imate business purpose might be asserted for it. 129
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Downs firmly
rejects the unbounded boycott dicta contained in Fashion Orig-
inators' Guild and Klor's. At least in regard to conduct occurring
in the context of a sports association's rules and regulations, the
decision clarifies the dual analytical approaches used in prior
124 665 F.2d at 789.
125 Id. at 790. The court referred with approval to Hatley v. American Quarter
Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, as well as to several similar holdings from non-equine sports.
See, e.g., Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d at
1365 (per se rule inapplicable to Bridge League's refusal to sanction a local tournament);
Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (golf tournament entry restric-
tions evaluated under rule of reason).
126 For the text of USTA RULE 5, see note 100 supra.
127 For the text of USTA RULE 17, see note 101 supra.
12 665 F.2d at 790.
129 Id. Following iemand to the district court, by order dated July 21, 1982, the lit-
igation was dismissed pursuant to a Stipulation of Dismissal and Final Judgment which
provides that the racetracks will apply for membership in USTA after paying a monetary




equine cases to limit the sweep of the per se boycott rule. The de-
cision endorses both the analysis of non-commercial context con-
tained in Trotting Association130 and the analysis of boycott pur-
pose relied upon in Hatley. 13
Thus, the court of appeals reasoned that a finding either (1)
that the challenged conduct arose from non-commercial needs in
a self-regulatory context or (2) that the challenged conduct does
not reveal an undeniably anticompetitive purpose will be suffi-
cient grounds for rejecting per se analysis in favor of the weigh-
ing of circumstances mandated by the rule of reason. In other
words, courts should undertake an initial consideration of the
context in which a boycott takes place and the purpose which it is
intended to serve. If either the context or the purpose would
make per se condemnation inadvisable, a full balancing of appli-
cable considerations under the rule of reason must be under-
taken. The underlying principle of the Chicago Downs decision
is that certain types of regulations in the context of a sports asso-
ciation, while initially restricting the participation of certain in-
dividuals or entities, ultimately serve to promote the sport's in-
tegrity, effective operation, and economic opportunities as a
whole. For such restrictions per se condemnation is inappropri-
ate.
Of course, a finding that a particular boycott should not be
condemned under the per se rule is not tantamount to a decision
that the exclusion is sanctioned by the antitrust laws. As the court
in Chicago Downs was careful to point out, the trial court on re-
mand would face the question of whether USTA's conduct "went
beyond the level of restraint reasonably necessary to accomplish
whatever legitimate business purpose might be asserted for it."'u
Thus, a court's determination not to apply the per se rule does
not constitute a finding that the antitrust laws sanction the con-
duct. Rather, it is a finding that the evaluation of the conduct's
competitive effects be undertaken according to the traditional
standards of the rule of reason.
130 See the text accompanying notes 38-48 supra for a discussion of the case.
131 See the text accompanying notes 56-63 supra for a discussion of the case.
132 665 F.2d at 790 (quoting Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1183).
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